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Empirical research on American poverty has largely focused on individual
characteristics to explain the occurrence and patterns of poverty. The argu-
ment in this article is that such an emphasis is misplaced. By focusing upon
individual attributes as the cause of poverty, social scientists have largely
missed the underlying dynamic of American impoverishment. Poverty
researchers have in effect focused on who loses out at the economic game,
rather than addressing the fact that the game produces losers in the first
place. We provide three lines of evidence to suggest that U.S. poverty
is ultimately the result of structural failings at the economic, political,
and social levels. These include an analysis into the lack of sufficient
jobs in the economy to raise families out of poverty or near poverty; a
comparative examination into the high rates of U.S. poverty as a result of
the ineffectiveness of the social safety net; and the systemic nature of poverty
as indicated by the life course risk of impoverishment experienced by a ma-
jority of Americans. We then briefly outline a framework for reinterpreting
American poverty. This perspective incorporates the prior research findings
that have focused on individual characteristics as important factors in who
loses out at the economic game, with the structural nature of American
poverty that ensures the existence of economic losers in the first place.
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Few questions have generated as much discussion across time
as that of the causes of human impoverishment. The sources
and origins of poverty have been debated for centuries. As the
historian R. M. Hartwell notes, "The causes of poverty, its relief
and cure, have been a matter of serious concern to theologians,
statesmen, civil servants, intellectuals, tax-payers and humanitar-
ians since the Middle Ages" (1986: 16). The question of causality
has found itself at the heart of most debates surrounding poverty
and the poor.
In recent times these debates have often been divided into
two ideological camps. On one hand, poverty has been viewed as
the result of individual failings. From this perspective, specific
attributes of the impoverished individual have brought about
their poverty. These include a wide set of characteristics, ranging
from the lack of an industrious work ethic or virtuous morality,
to low levels of education or competitive labor market skills. On
the other hand, poverty has periodically been interpreted as the
result of failings at the structural level, such as the inability of the
economy to produce enough decent paying jobs.
Within the United States, the dominant perspective has been
that of poverty as an individual failing. From Ben Franklin's Poor
Richard's Almanac to the recent welfare reform changes, poverty
has been conceptualized primarily as a consequence of individual
failings and deficiencies. Indeed, social surveys asking about the
causes of poverty have consistently found that Americans tend to
rank individual reasons (such as laziness, lack of effort, and low
ability) as the most important factors related to poverty, while
structural reasons such as unemployment or discrimination are
viewed as significantly less important (Feagin, 1975; Gilens, 1999;
Kluegel and Smith, 1986).
This emphasis on individual attributes as the primary cause
of poverty has also been reinforced by social scientists engaged
in poverty research (O'Connor, 2001). As the social survey has
become the dominant methodological approach during the past
50 years, and with multivariate modeling becoming the principal
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statistical technique, the research emphasis has increasingly fallen
on understanding poverty and welfare dependency in terms of
individual attributes. The unit of analysis in these studies is by
definition the individual rather than the wider social or eco-
nomic structures, resulting in statistical models of individual
characteristics predicting individual behavior. Consequently, the
long standing tension between structural versus individual ap-
proaches to explaining poverty has largely been tilted within
the empirical poverty research community towards that of the
individual. As Alice O'Connor writes,
That this tension has more often been resolved in favor of the
individualist interpretation can be seen in several oft-noted features
in poverty research. One is the virtual absence of class as an analytic
category, at least as compared with more individualized measures
of status such as family background and human capital. A similar
individualizing tendency can be seen in the reduction of race and
gender to little more than demographic, rather than structurally
constituted, categories (2001: 9).
The argument in this article is that such an emphasis is mis-
placed and misdirected. By focusing on individual attributes as
the cause of poverty, social scientists have largely missed the
underlying dynamic of American impoverishment. Poverty re-
searchers have in effect focused on who loses out at the economic
game, rather than addressing the fact that the game produces
losers in the first place. An analysis into this underlying dynamic
is critical to advancing our state of knowledge regarding Ameri-
can poverty.
Of course, not all social scientists have abandoned the impor-
tance of structural considerations with respect to poverty. The
work of William Ryan (1971), Michael Katz (1989), Herbert Gans
(1995), Douglass Massey (1996) and Joe Feagin (2000) come to
mind. However, it should not be a surprise that most of these
scholars have taken a theoretical or historical approach, rather
than a statistical one. There is a need to articulate the quantitative
evidence supporting the argument that U.S. poverty is ultimately
the result of structural failings at the economic, political, and
social levels.
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Current Understanding of American Poverty
The current research emphasis upon understanding Amer-
ican poverty has largely focused on the individual and demo-
graphic characteristics of the poor. These characteristics have, in
turn, been used to explain why particular individuals and house-
holds experience poverty. This approach has revealed the extent
to which the risk of poverty varies across particular individual
and household attributes.
Repeated cross-sectional national surveys such as the Cur-
rent Population Survey have indicated that the likelihood of
poverty varies sharply with respect to age, race, gender, family
structure, and residence. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau
(2003a) reports that while the overall U.S. poverty rate in 2002
was 12.1 percent, it was 16.7 percent for children and for those
residing in central cities, 24.1 percent for African Americans, and
28.8 percent for persons in female headed households. Other
demographic characteristics closely associated with the risk of
poverty include giving birth outside of marriage, families with
larger numbers of children, and having children at an early age
(Maynard, 1997).
In addition, cross-sectional research has shown a close associ-
ation between human capital characteristics and an individual's
risk of poverty-those who are lacking in human capital are much
more likely to experience poverty than individuals with greater
levels of human capital. Specifically, lower levels of education,
less marketable work skills and experience, and having a physical
disability that interferes with an individual's ability to participate
in the labor market are all highly correlated with an elevated
risk of poverty (Blank, 1997; Schiller, 2004). On the other hand,
research comparing the attitudes and motivation of the poor ver-
sus the non-poor, have found relatively few differences between
these two groups (Goodwin, 1973; 1983; Lichter and Crowley,
2002; Rank, 1994; Seccombe, 1999) and little in the way of their
being a causal factor leading to poverty (Duncan, 1984; Edwards
et al., 2001).
Longitudinal studies examining the dynamics of poverty
have addressed the length of time and particular factors related to
a spell of poverty. This body of work indicates that most spells of
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poverty are of modest length. The typical pattern is that house-
holds are impoverished for one, two, or three years, and then
manage to get above the poverty line (Bane and Ellwood, 1986;
Blank, 1997; Duncan, 1984; Walker, 1994). They may stay there for
a period of time, only to experience an additional fall into poverty
at some later point. For example, Stevens (1994; 1999) calculated
that of all persons who had managed to get themselves above
the poverty line, over half would return to poverty within five
years. Since their economic distance above the poverty threshold
is often modest, a detrimental economic or social event can push
a household back below the poverty line.
Longitudinal research has also focused on the nature of such
events and individual changes that result in a spell of poverty
(Devine and Wright, 1993; Duncan, 1984; Walker, 1994). The most
important of these have been the loss of employment and earn-
ings, along with changes in family structure. For example, using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Duncan et
al. (1995) found that two thirds of all entries into poverty were
associated with either a reduction in work (48 percent) or the loss
of work (18 percent). Divorce and separation were associated with
triggering approximately 10 percent of all spells of poverty. Blank
(1997) found that employment and family structure changes were
also influential in ending spells of poverty. Two thirds of those
below the poverty line escaped impoverishment as a result of
increases in the individual earnings of family members or in-
creases from other sources of income, while the remaining third
had their spells of poverty end as a result of changes in family
structure (such as marriage or a child leaving the household). In
addition, research has shown that illness and incapacitation are
also important factors contributing to falls into poverty (Schiller,
2004).
A substantial body of work has also examined the dynamics
of welfare use and dependency. This research has shown that indi-
viduals utilizing public assistance programs and who experience
longer spells of welfare are often at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-
vis the labor market (Bane and Ellwood, 1994; Boisjoly et al., 1998;
Harris, 1996; Moffitt, 1992; Pavetti, 1992; Rank, 1988; Sandefur
and Cook, 1998). Consequently, those with work disabilities, low
education, greater numbers of children, and/or living in inner-
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city areas are more likely to extensively utilize the welfare system.
The results from these studies largely mirror the findings that
have been gathered regarding the length and duration of poverty
spells.
The above body of work has provided an important under-
standing into who are the economic losers in American society. Yet
at the same time it has failed to address the question of why there
are economic losers in the first place? The premise of this article is
that in order answer this question, it is essential to analyze specific
failings at the structural level.
The Structural Nature of Poverty
Three lines of evidence are detailed in order to illustrate the
structural nature of poverty-I) the inability of the U.S. labor
market to provide enough decent paying jobs for all families to
avoid poverty or near poverty; 2) the ineffectiveness of American
social policy to reduce levels of poverty through governmental
social safety net programs; and 3) the fact that the majority of the
population will experience poverty during their adult lifetimes,
indicative of the systemic nature of U.S. poverty. Each of these
lines of evidence are intended to empirically illustrate that Amer-
ican poverty is by and large the result of structural failures and
processes.
The Inability of the Labor Market to Support All Families
Several of the pioneering large scale studies of poverty con-
ducted at the end of the 19'th and beginning of the 20'th century
focused heavily on the importance of labor market failings to
explain poverty. The work of Charles Booth (1892-1897), Seebohm
Rowntree (1901), Hull House (1895), Robert Hunter (1904), and
W. E. B. DuBois (1899) all emphasized the importance of inad-
equate wages, lack of jobs, and unstable working conditions as
a primary cause of poverty. For example, Rowntree (1901) esti-
mated that approximately 57 percent of individuals in poverty
were there as a direct result of labor market failures (low wages,
unemployment, irregularity of work).
Yet by the 1960's the emphasis had shifted from a critique of
the economic structure as a primary cause of poverty, to an anal-
ysis of individual deficiencies (e.g., the lack of human capital) as
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the underlying reason for poverty. As Timothy Bartik (2001) notes,
U.S. antipoverty policy has focused heavily on labor supply poli-
cies (e.g. increasing individual's human capital or incentives to
work through welfare reform) rather than labor demand policies
(increasing the number and quality of jobs). As mentioned earlier,
social scientific research has reinforced this policy approach by
focusing on individual deficiencies to explain individual poverty.
Yet it can be demonstrated that irrespective of the specific
characteristics that Americans possess, there simply are not
enough decent paying jobs to support all of those (and their
families) who are looking for work. During the past 25 years the
American economy has increasingly produced larger numbers of
low paying jobs, jobs that are part-time, and jobs that are lacking
in benefits (Seccombe, 2000). For example, the Census Bureau
estimated that the median hourly earning of workers who were
paid hourly wages in 2000 was $9.91, while at the same time
approximately three million Americans were working part-time
as a result of the lack of sufficient full-time work being available
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). In addition, 43.6 million Americans
were lacking in health insurance, largely because their employer
did not provide such benefits (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003b).
Studies analyzing the percentage of the U.S. workforce falling
into the low wage sector have shown that a much higher per-
centage of American workers fall into this category when com-
pared with their counterparts in other developed countries. For
example, Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtless (2000) found that 25
percent of all U.S. full-time workers could be classified as working
in low wage work (defined as earning less than 65 percent of the
national median earnings on full-time jobs). This was by far the
highest percentage of the countries analyzed, with the overall
average falling at 12.9 percent.
One of the reasons for this has been the fact that the minimum
wage has remained at low levels and has not been indexed to
inflation. Changes in the minimum wage must come through
Congressional legislation. This often leads to years going by be-
fore Congress acts to adjust the minimum wage upward, causing
it to lag further behind the cost of living.
Beyond the low wages, part-time work, and lack of benefits,
there is also a mismatch between the actual number of available
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jobs and the number of those who need them. Economists fre-
quently discuss what is known as a natural unemployment rate-
that in order for a free market economy to effectively function, a
certain percentage of laborers need to be out of work. For exam-
ple, full employment would impede the ability of employers to
attract and hire workers, particularly within the low wage sector.
Consequently, a certain degree of unemployment appears sys-
tematic within a capitalist economy, irrespective of the individual
characteristics possessed by those participating in that economy.
During the past 40 years, U.S. monthly unemployment rates
have averaged between 4 and 10 percent (U.S. Census Bureau,
2001). These percentages represent individuals who are out of
work but are actively looking for employment. In 2001 this trans-
lated into nearly 7 million people unemployed at any particular
point in time throughout the year, while over 15 million people ex-
perienced unemployment at some point during the year (Schiller,
2004). Certainly some of these individuals have voluntarily left
their jobs in order to locate another job (known as frictional un-
employment), while in other cases the unemployed may include
individuals whose family's are not dependent upon their job for
its economic survival , such as teenagers looking for summer
work. Nevertheless, a good proportion of unemployment is the
result of involuntary reasons, such as layoffs and downsizing,
directly affecting millions of heads of households.
Bartik (2001; 2002) used several different approaches and
assumptions to estimate the number of jobs that would be needed
to significantly address the issue of poverty in the United States.
Data were analyzed from the 1998 Current Population Survey.
His conclusion? Even in the booming economy of the late 1990's,
between five and nine million more jobs were needed in order to
meet the needs of the poor and disadvantaged.
The structural failing of the labor market to support the pool
of labor that currently exists can be further illustrated through
an analysis of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). The SIPP is a large ongoing longitudinal study that inter-
views households every four months over the course of three or
four years, gathering detailed monthly information regarding in-
dividual's employment and income across these periods of time.
It allows one to map the patterns of labor force participation for a
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large nationally representative sample (for an in-depth discussion
of the history, methodology, and specific details of the SIPP data
set, see Westat, 2001).
An analysis of the SIPP illustrates the mismatch between the
number of jobs in the labor market that will enable a family to
subsist above the threshold of poverty, versus the number of
heads of families in need of such jobs. Table 1 is based upon
the jobs and work behavior of family heads across all 12 months
of 1999. From this we can estimate the annual number of hours
worked, the annual amount of pay received, and whether such
earnings were sufficient to raise a family above the poverty line.
The analysis is confined to heads of families who are between the
ages of 18 and 64.
In Table 1, we examine whether the jobs that family heads
were working at during the year were able to get their current
families out of poverty. Three poverty thresholds are examined-
below 1.00 (the official poverty line); below 1.25 of the poverty line
(the official poverty line raised by 25 percent); and below 1.50 of
the poverty line (the official poverty line raised by 50 percent). To
illustrate, the poverty line for a family of 4 in 1999 was $17,029.
Consequently the 1.25 poverty threshold for this family would be
$21,286, while the 1.50 poverty threshold would be $25,544. These
thresholds provide us with several alternative levels of poverty
and near poverty.
Our focus is on the availability of jobs in the labor market to lift
various families out of poverty. We examine this question for three
different populations of family heads who are in the labor market.
The first panel focuses only on those heads of families who are
working full-time throughout the year (defined as averaging 35
or more hours per week across the 52 weeks of the year). The
second panel includes those working full-time as well as those
who are working at least half-time throughout the year (defined
as working an average of 20 or more hours per week across 52
weeks). The third panel includes all heads of families in the labor
market (defined as any head of family who has either worked at
some point during the year or who has been actively looking for
work).
For those employed full-time during 1999, 9.4 percent are
working in jobs where their annual earnings will not get their
12 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Table 1
Inability of the Labor Market to Support Various Family Structures
Above Different Poverty Thresholds
Current Family Status
Poverty All Married Couple One Parent Single
Threshold Families Families Families Families
Heads of Families Working Full-Time
Below 1.00 9.4 9.9 16.9 3.2
Below 1.25 15.3 16.0 26.4 6.6
Below 1.50 22.0 23.0 36.6 10.2
N 9,891 6,053 1,557 2,281
Heads of Families Working Half-Time or More
Below 1.00 14.9 13.5 27.7 9.5
Below 1.25 21.4 19.8 37.0 14.3
Below 1.50 28.0 26.7 46.5 18.3
N 11,312 6,623 1,969 2,720
Heads of Families in the Labor Market
Below 1.00 20.3 17.1 36.8 15.8
Below 1.25 26.5 23.3 44.9 20.4
Below 1.50 32.7 30.0 53.4 24.2
N 12,190 6,972 2,259 2,959
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, authors' computations
families above the poverty line, 15.3 percent are at jobs in which
their earnings will not get their families above 1.25 of the poverty
line, and 22.0 percent are employed at jobs that will not get their
families above 1.50 of the poverty line. We can clearly see that the
jobs one parent family heads are working at are much less able to
sustain these households above the level of poverty than that for
all families. On the other hand, single men and women are more
likely to be able to lift themselves out of poverty through their
work. Married couples fall in between these two family types
(it should be kept in mind that for these couples, we are only
focusing on the ability of the family head's job to lift the household
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above the threshold of poverty, rather than the earnings of both
partners).
The middle panel illustrates that if we include family heads
who are working either full-time or at least half-time throughout
the year, nearly 15 percent were working at jobs in which their
income would not raise their families above the poverty line, 21.4
percent were at jobs that would not get their families over 1.25 of
the poverty line, while 28 percent fell below 1.50 of the poverty
line. Finally, the bottom panel includes all family heads that were
in the labor market at some point during the year. Here we can
see that the percentages for the three poverty thresholds are 20.3,
26.5, and 32.7.
Consequently, depending on the level of poverty and the
size of the pool of labor, the failure of the labor market to raise
families out of poverty ranges from 9.4 percent (utilizing the
official poverty line for those working full-time) to 32.7 percent
(applying 1.50 of the poverty line for all who are in the labor
market). To use an analogy that will be developed later, the supply
of jobs versus the demand for labor might be thought of as an
ongoing game of musical chairs. That is, there is a finite number
of jobs available in the labor market that pay enough to support
a family above the threshold of poverty (which might be thought
of as the chairs in this analogy). On the other hand, the amount of
labor, as represented by the number of family heads in the labor
market (and hence the players in the game), is greater than the
number of adequately paying jobs. As indicated in Table 1, this
imbalance ranges from 9.4 percent to 32.7 percent. Consequently,
the structure of the labor market basically ensures that some
families will lose out at this musical chairs game of finding a
decent paying job able to lift a family above the threshold of
poverty.
Table 2 illustrates this in a slightly different fashion. Here
we estimate the earnings capacity of jobs held by family heads
to support various hypothetical family sizes above our three
different thresholds of poverty. What is clear from this table is that
for the pool of family heads who are working full-time, the jobs
that they are employed at are quite able to support a one or two
person family above the official poverty line. For example, only
2.4 percent are in full-time jobs in which their earnings would not
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Table 2
Inability of the Labor Market to Support Various Family Sizes Above
Different Poverty Thresholds
Hypothetical Family Size
1 2 3 4 5 6
Poverty Person Person Person Person Person Person
Threshold Family Family Family Family Family Family
Heads of Families Working Full-Time
Below 1.00 2.4 4.7 7.6 15.0 22.3 29.0
Below 1.25 4.3 8.9 14.0 25.1 35.0 42.4
Below 1.50 7.2 14.5 21.8 36.0 46.3 54.6
Heads of Families Working Half-Time or More
Below 1.00 6.3 10.2 13.8 21.6 28.9 35.3
Below 1.25 9.6 15.2 20.6 31.6 41.0 47.9
Below 1.50 13.2 21.1 28.3 42.0 51.6 59.3
Heads of Families in the Labor Market
Below 1.00 12.0 15.8 19.3 26.9 33.7 39.7
Below 1.25 15.3 20.8 25.9 36.3 45.0 51.5
Below 1.50 18.8 26.4 33.2 46.0 54.9 62.1
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, authors' computations
raise a one person family above the official poverty line, while 4.7
percent of family heads are working at jobs that would not raise
a family of two above the poverty line.
However, as we look at the ability of such jobs to get larger
sized families above the thresholds of poverty, we can see their
increasing failure to do so. Consequently, 15 percent of these jobs
will not raise a family of four above 1.00 of the poverty line. At
the 1.25 level the figure is 25.1 percent, and at the 1.50 level it
is 36 percent. Thus, the current supply of full-time jobs in the
labor market would appear able to lift most one or two person
families out of poverty, but it becomes much less effective in
raising moderate sized families out of poverty. As we include
family heads who are working at least half-time (the middle panel
of Table 2) or who are in the labor market (the bottom panel of
Table 2) the percentages rise significantly.
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Finally, we can illustrate this in yet another manner. Using
the SIPP data again for 1999, we estimated the annual average
hourly wages for heads of families. This analysis indicates that
12.1 percent of family heads were working at jobs which paid
an average of less than 6 dollars an hour, 21.2 percent worked at
jobs paying less than 8 dollars an hour, 31.7 percent worked at
jobs paying less than 10 dollars an hour, and 42.7 percent were
earning less than 12 dollars an hour. In order to raise a family of
three above the official poverty line in 1999 one would have to be
working full-time (defined as averaging 35 hours per week across
the 52 weeks of the year) at $7.30 an hour, and for a family of four
the figure would be $9.36 an hour.. The fact that nearly one third
of family heads are working at jobs paying less than $10.00 an
hour, is indicative of the significant risk of poverty that they face.
To summarize, the data presented in this section indicates
that a major factor leading to poverty in the United States is a
failing of the economic structure to provide viable opportunities
for all who are participating in that system. In particular, the labor
market simply does not provide enough decent paying jobs for all
who need them. As a result, millions of families find themselves
struggling below or precariously close to the poverty line.
The Ineffectiveness of the Social Safety Net to Prevent Poverty
A second major structural failure is found at the political level.
Contrary to the popular rhetoric of vast amounts of tax dollars
being spent on public assistance, the American welfare state, and
particularly its social safety net, can be more accurately described
in minimalist terms (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Compared to other
Western industrialized countries, the United States devotes far
fewer resources to programs aimed at assisting the economically
vulnerable (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, 1999). As Charles Noble writes, "The U.S. welfare state is
striking precisely because it is so limited in scope and ambition"
(1997: 3).
On the other hand, most European countries provide a wide
range of social and insurance programs that largely prevent fam-
ilies from falling into poverty. These include substantial family
or children's allowances, designed to transfer cash assistance
to families with children. Unemployment assistance is far more
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generous in these countries than in the United States, often pro-
viding support for more than a year following the loss of a job.
Furthermore, universal health coverage is routinely provided,
along with considerable support for child care.
The result of these social policy differences is that they sub-
stantially reduce the extent of poverty in Europe and Canada,
while U.S. social policy has had only a small impact upon pov-
erty reduction. As Rebecca Blank notes, "the national choice in
the United States to provide relatively less generous transfers
to low-income families has meant higher relative poverty rates
in the country. While low-income families in the United States
work more than in many other countries, they are not able to
make up for lower governmental income support relative to their
European counterparts" (Blank, 1997:141-142).
This effect can be clearly seen in Table 3. The data in this table
are based upon an analysis of the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) conducted by Veli-Matti Ritakallio (2001). Initiated in the
1980s, the LIS contains income and demographic information on
households in over 25 different nations from 1967 to the present.
Variables have been standardized across 70 data sets, allowing
researchers to conduct cross-national analyses regarding poverty
and the effectiveness of governmental programs in alleviating
such poverty (for further detail regarding the LIS, see Luxem-
bourg Income Study, 2000). Poverty in this analysis is defined as
being in a household in which its disposable income is less than
one half of the median annual income.
Table 3 compares eight European countries and Canada with
the United States in terms of their pre-transfer and post-transfer
rates of poverty. The pre-transfer rates (column one) indicate what
the level of poverty would be in each country in the absence of
any governmental income transfers such as welfare payments,
unemployment compensation, or social security payments. The
post-transfer rates (column two) represent the level of poverty
after governmental transfers are included (which is how poverty
is officially measured in the United States and many other coun-
tries). In-kind benefits such as medical insurance are not included
in the analysis. Comparing these two levels of poverty (column
three) reveals how effective (or ineffective) governmental policy
is in reducing the overall extent of poverty in a country.
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Table 3
Comparative Analysis of Governmental Effectiveness in Reducing
Poverty Across Selected Countries
Pre-transfer Post-transfer Reduction
Country Poverty Rates Poverty Rates Factor
Canada (1994) 29 10 66
Finland (1995) 33 4 88
France (1994) 39 8 79
Germany (1994) 29 7 76
Netherlands (1994) 30 7 77
Norway (1995) 27 4 85
Sweden (1995) 36 3 92
United Kingdom (1995) 38 13 66
United States (1994) 29 18 38
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, adapted from Veli-Matti Ritakallio (2001)
computations
Looking first at the rates of pre-transfer poverty, we can see
that the United States is on the lower end of the scale. Norway's
pre-transfer poverty rate is 27 percent, followed by the United
States, Canada, and Germany at 29 percent. The Netherlands pre-
transfer rate is 30 percent, Finland stands at 33 percent, Sweden is
at 36 percent, the United Kingdom rate is 38 percent, and finally,
France possesses the highest level of pre-transfer poverty at 39
percent.
When we examine the post-transfer rates of poverty found in
column two, a dramatic reversal takes place in terms of where
the United States stands vis-a-vis the comparison countries. The
average post-transfer poverty rate for the eight comparison coun-
tries in Table 3 is 7 percent, whereas the United States' post-
transfer poverty rate stands at 18 percent. As a result of their more
active social policies, Canada and the European countries are able
to significantly cut their overall rates of poverty. For example,
Sweden is able to reduce the number of people that would be
poor (in the absence of any governmental help) by 92 percent as
a result of social policies. The overall average reduction factor for
the eight countries is 79 percent. In contrast, the United States
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poverty reduction factor is only 38 percent (with much of this
being the result of Social Security).
Table 3 clearly illustrates a second major structural failing
leading to the high rates of U.S. poverty It is a failure at the polit-
ical and policy level. Specifically, social and economic programs
directed to the economically vulnerable populations in the United
States are minimal in their ability to raise families out of poverty.
While America has always been a "reluctant welfare state," the
past 25 years have witnessed several critical retrenchments and
reductions in the social safety net. These reductions have included
scaling back both the amount of benefits being transferred, as
well as a tightening of program eligibility (Noble, 1997; Patterson,
2000). In addition, the United States has failed to offer the type of
universal coverage for child care, medical insurance, or child al-
lowances that most other developed countries routinely provide.
As a result, the overall U.S. poverty rates remain at extremely
high levels.
Once again, this failure has virtually nothing to do with the in-
dividual. Rather it is emblematic of a failure at the structural level.
By focusing on individual characteristics, we lose sight of the fact
that governments can and do exert a sizeable impact on reducing
the extent of poverty within their jurisdictions. In the analysis
presented here, Canada and Europe are able to lift a significant
percentage of their economically vulnerable above the threshold
of poverty through governmental transfer and assistance policies.
In contrast, the United States provides substantially less support
through its social safety net, resulting in poverty rates that are
currently the highest in the industrialized world.
The one case where the U.S. has effectively reduced the rate
of poverty for a particular group has been that of the elderly.
Their substantial reduction in the risk of poverty over the past 40
years has been directly attributed to the increasing generosity
of the Social Security program, as well as the introduction of
Medicare in 1965 and the Supplemental Security Income Program
in 1974. During the 1960's and 1970's, Social Security benefits
were substantially increased and indexed to the rate of inflation,
helping many of the elderly escape from poverty. It is estimated
today that without the Social Security program, the poverty rate
for the elderly would be close to 50 percent (rather than its current
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10 percent). Put another way, Social Security is responsible for
getting 80 percent of the elderly above the poverty line who would
otherwise be poor in its absence.
The Widespread Life Course Risk of Poverty
A third approach revealing the structural nature of American
poverty can be found in a life course analysis of poverty. As dis-
cussed earlier, previous work on poverty has examined the cross-
sectional and spell dynamic risk. Yet there is another way in which
the incidence of poverty can be examined. Such an approach
places the risk of poverty within the context of the American life
course. By doing so, the systematic nature of American poverty
can be revealed.
The work of Rank and Hirschl (1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2001a;
2001b) has developed this approach. Building upon the longitu-
dinal design of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Rank and
Hirschl have utilized a technique for constructing a series of life
tables estimating the probability that Americans will experience
poverty at some point during their adulthood (see Rank and
Hirschl, 2001c, for a more detailed description of their methodol-
ogy and approach, and Hill, 1992, for a further discussion of the
PSID).
Table 4 is based upon three separate life tables estimating the
age specific and cumulative probabilities of experiencing pov-
erty between the ages of 20 and 75 for the following poverty
thresholds-il.00 (the official poverty line); 1.25 (the poverty line
raised by 25 percent), and 1.50 (the poverty line raised by 50
percent). Table 4 reports the cumulative percentages of the Amer-
ican population that will encounter poverty at various points of
adulthood.
At age 20 (the starting point of the analysis), we can see that
10.6 percent of Americans fell below the poverty line (which is
similar to the cross-sectional rate of poverty for 20 year olds),
with 15 percent falling below the 1.25 threshold and 19.1 percent
falling below the 1.50 threshold. By the age of 35, the percent
of Americans experiencing poverty has increased sharply-31.4
percent of Americans have experienced at least one year below
the poverty line; 39 percent have experienced at least one year
below 1.25 of the poverty line; and 46.9 percent have experienced
Table 4
The Cumulative Percent of
Adulthood
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Americans Experiencing Poverty Across
Level of Poverty
Below 1.00 Below 1.25 Below 1.50
Age Poverty Line Poverty Line Poverty Line
20 10.6 15.0 19.1
25 21.6 27.8 34.3
30 27.1 34.1 41.3
35 31.4 39.0 46.9
40 35.6 43.6 51.7
45 38.8 46.7 55.0
50 41.8 49.6 57.9
55 45.0 52.8 61.0
60 48.2 56.1 64.2
65 51.4 59.7 67.5
70 55.0 63.6 71.8
75 58.5 68.0 76.0
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, authors' computations
a year below 1.50 of the poverty line. At age 55 the percentages
stand at 45.0, 52.8, and 61.0, and by the age of 75, they have risen
to 58.5 percent, 68 percent and 76 percent.
What these numbers indicate is that a clear majority of Ameri-
cans will at some point experience poverty during their lifetimes.
Rather than an isolated event that occurs only among what has
been labeled the "underclass," the reality is that the majority of
Americans will encounter poverty firsthand during their adult-
hoods.
Such patterns illuminate the systematic essence of American
poverty, which in turn points to the structural nature of poverty.
Occasionally we can physically see widespread examples of this.
For instance, the economic collapse during the Great Depression
of the 1930's. Given the enormity of this collapse, it became clear
to many Americans that most of their neighbors were not directly
responsible for the dire economic situation they found themselves
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in. This awareness helped provide much of the impetus and
justification behind the New Deal (Patterson, 2000).
Similarly, the existence of the "other" America as noted by
Michael Harrington (1962) during the early 1960's, pointed again
to the widespread nature of U.S. poverty. The other America
was represented by the extremely high rates of poverty found in
economically depressed areas such as rural Appalachia and the
urban inner city. The War on Poverty during the 1960's was an
attempt to address these large scale structural pockets of poverty
amidst plenty.
The analysis in this section indicates that poverty may be
as widespread and systematic today as in these more visible
examples. Yet we have been unable to see this as a result of
not looking in the right direction. By focusing on the life span
risks, the prevalent nature of American poverty is revealed. At
some point during adulthood, the bulk of Americans will face
impoverishment. The approach of emphasizing individual fail-
ings or attributes as the primary cause of poverty loses much of
its explanatory power in the face of such patterns. Rather, given
the widespread occurrence of economic vulnerability, a life span
analysis points to a third line of evidence indicating that poverty
is more appropriately viewed as a structural failing of American
society. As C. Wright Mills notes in his analysis of unemployment,
When, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his
personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character
of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in
a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed,
that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within
the range of opportunities open to any one individual. The very
structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement
of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to
consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and
not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of indi-
viduals (1959: 9).
To summarize, three lines of evidence have been detailed sug-
gesting that American poverty is primarily the result of structural
conditions. These include a lack of sufficient paying jobs in the
labor market, the ineffectiveness of America's social safety net to
pull individuals and families out of poverty, and the fact that a
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clear majority of Americans will experience poverty at some point
during their adulthood years. Other structural failings could have
been explored as well (e.g., the inequities in educational quality
in the United States, the systematic lack of political power for
the economically disenfranchised, or the widespread patterns of
racial residential segregation, to name but a few). Nevertheless,
the lines of evidence discussed in this section would appear
particularly illuminating in revealing the structural nature of
American poverty.
Discussion
Given the above arguments and evidence indicating that
American poverty is primarily the result of structural failings,
how might we reconcile this perspective with the earlier dis-
cussed research findings indicating that human capital and in-
dividual attributes largely explain who is at risk of experiencing
poverty? An approach that bridges the empirical importance of
individual attributes with the significance of structural forces has
been the concept of structural vulnerability (Rank, 1994; 2000;
2001; 2004). This framework recognizes that human capital and
other labor market attributes are associated with who loses out at
the economic game (and hence will be more likely to experience
poverty), but that structural factors predominately ensure that
there will be losers in the first place.
An analogy can be used to illustrate the basic concept. Imagine
a game of musical chairs in which there are ten players but only
eight chairs. On one hand, individual success or failure in the
game depends on the skill and luck of each player. Those who are
less agile or less well placed when the music stops are more likely
to lose. These are appropriately cited as the reasons a particular
individual has lost the game. On the other hand, given that there
are only eight chairs available, two players are bound to lose
regardless of their characteristics. Even if all the players were
suddenly to double their speed and agility, there would still be
two losers. From this broader context, the characteristics of the
individual players are no longer important in terms of under-
standing that the structure of the game ensures that someone
must inevitably lose.
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We would argue that this analogy applies with respect to pov-
erty. For every ten American households, there are good jobs and
opportunities at any point in time to adequately support roughly
eight of those ten. The remaining two households will be locked
out of such opportunities, often resulting in poverty or near
poverty. Individuals experiencing such economic deprivation are
likely to have characteristics putting them at a disadvantage
in terms of competing in the economy (lower education, fewer
skills, single-parent families, illness or incapacitation, minorities
residing in inner cities, etc.). These characteristics help to explain
why particular individuals and households are at a greater risk
of poverty.
However, given the earlier discussed structural failures, a
certain percentage of the American population will experience
economic vulnerability regardless of what their characteristics
are. As in the musical chairs analogy, increasing everyone's hu-
man capital will do little to alter the fact that there are only so
many decent paying jobs available. In such a case, employers
will simply raise the bar in terms of the employee qualifications
they are seeking, but nevertheless there will remain a percentage
of the population at risk of economic deprivation. Consequently,
although a lack of human capital and its accompanying vulnera-
bility leads to an understanding of who the losers of the economic
game are likely to be, the structural components of our economic,
social, and political systems explain why there are losers in the
first place.
The critical mistake that has been made in the past has been
that social scientists have frequently equated the question of who
loses out at the game, with the question of why the game produces
losers in the first place. They are, in fact, distinct and separate
questions. While deficiencies in human capital and other mar-
ketable characteristics help to explain who in the population is at
a heightened risk of encountering poverty, the fact that poverty
exists in the first place results not from these characteristics, but
from the lack of decent opportunities and supports in society. By
focusing solely upon individual characteristics, such as educa-
tion, we can shuffle people up or down in terms of their being
more likely to land a job with good earnings, but we are still
going to have somebody lose out if there are not enough decent
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paying jobs to go around. In short, we are playing a large scale
version of a musical chairs game with ten players but only eight
chairs.
The recognition of this dynamic represents a fundamental
shift in thinking from the old paradigm. It helps to explain why
the social policies of the past two decades have largely been
ineffective in reducing the rates of poverty. We have focused
our attention and resources on either altering the incentives and
disincentives for those playing the game, or in a very limited way,
upgrading their skills and ability to compete in the game, while
at the same time leaving the structure of the game untouched.
When the overall poverty rates in the United States do in fact
go up or down, they do so primarily as a result of impacts on
the structural level that increase or decrease the number of avail-
able chairs. In particular, the performance of the economy has
been historically important. Why? Because when the economy is
expanding, more opportunities (or chairs) are available for the
competing pool of labor and their families. The reverse occurs
when the economy slows down and contracts. Consequently,
during the 1930's or early 1980's when the economy was doing
badly, poverty rates went up, while during periods of economic
prosperity such as the 1960's or the middle to later 1990's, the
overall rates of poverty declined.
Similarly, changes in various social supports and the social
safety net available to families will make a difference in terms
of how well such households are able to avoid poverty or near
poverty. When such supports were increased through the War
on Poverty initiatives in the 1960's, poverty rates declined. Like-
wise, when Social Security benefits were expanded during the
1960's and 1970's, the elderly's poverty rates declined precipi-
tously. Conversely, when social supports have been weakened
and eroded, as in the case of children's programs over the past 25
years, their rates of poverty have gone up.
The recognition of poverty as a result of the way the game
is structured also makes it quite clear why the United States
has such high rates of poverty when compared to other Western
countries. These rates have nothing to do with Americans being
less motivated or less skilled than those in other countries, but
American Poverty 25
with the fact that our economy has been producing a plethora of
low wage jobs in the face of global competition and that our social
policies have done relatively little to support families compared to
our European neighbors. From this perspective, one of the keys to
addressing poverty is to increase the labor market opportunities
and social supports available to American households.
The structural vulnerability perspective thus recognizes the
importance of human capital in being able to predict who is more
likely to experience economic deprivation, while at the same time
emphasizing the importance of structural constraints in guar-
anteeing that some Americans will be left out of the economic
mainstream. In short, the structure of the American economy, ac-
companied by a weak social safety net and public policies directed
to the economically vulnerable, ensure that a certain percentage of
the American population will experience impoverishment at any
point in time, and that a much larger percentage of the population
will experience poverty over the course of a lifetime. The fact
that three quarters of Americans will experience poverty or near
poverty (at the 1.50 level) during their adulthoods is emblematic
of these structural level failings.
As noted at the beginning of this article, social scientists
investigating poverty have largely focused upon individual de-
ficiencies and demographic attributes in order to explain the
occurrence of poverty in America. As such, they have reinforced
the mainstream American ethos of interpreting social problems
as primarily the result of individual failings. In addition, a culture
of poverty perspective has occasionally been used to explain the
occurrence of poverty within specific geographical settings such
as inner cities or remote rural areas. This approach also tends to
largely place the dynamic of poverty within the framework of
individual deficiencies.
We have argued and attempted to demonstrate in this ar-
ticle that such perspectives are misguided. Whereas individual
attributes (such as human capital) help to explain who faces a
greater risk of experiencing poverty at any point in time, the
fact that substantial poverty exists on a national level can only
be understood through an analysis of the structural dynamics of
American society.
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